RWAFF: 1944-1945 Burma

...
Both West African Divisions had excelled at their tasks. Their casualties had been the heaviest of XV Corps.
The total killed, wounded and missing in the Corps (including Corps Troops and 22 (E.A.) Brigade) was 5,093, out of which the equivalent casualty figures for the West African and Indian Divisions were:

81st (W.A.) Div — 438

82nd (W.A.) Div. — 2,085

25 (Indian) Div. — 1,374

26 (Indian) Div. — 606

A modest estimate of Japanese casualties, including prisoners (129) over the same period, totals 9,353.
...
Together with its vital ancillary units the 82nd Division had joined action on the 14th December 1944.
On the conclusion of operations in May 1945, its brigades had covered despite the appalling terrain and conditions:

1st Brigade ( Nigeria ) 285 miles

2nd Brigade (Gold Coast) 274 miles

4th Brigade ( Nigeria ) 428 miles

Recce Regt 282 miles

Throughout these operations the ‘carrier’ Auxiliary Groups had played a vital and prominent role.

The Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment continued down the other bank of the river towards Apaukwa and Kanzauk. At this latter location, the regiment met the 4th Brigade, the first Brigade from the 82nd Division to cross the range from Hzitwe. The meeting took place on the 7th January 1945, with the 81st Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment coming under the command of the 82nd Division for the operation to capture Myohaung.

Thirty thousand Nigerians fought in World War 2. They saw action at Juba, Goluin, Marda Pass, Babile Gap, Bisidimo, Colito, Omo and Lechemti during the Abyssinian campaign in East Africa from 1940-41. The 12th African division in that theater consisted of the 1st South African Brigade Group, 22nd, 25th, 26th and 28th East African, 23rd Nigerian and 24th Gold Coast Brigades. The brunt of actual fighting beginning in Somaliland (Mogadishu) through to Ethiopia was borne by the 23rd Nigerian Brigade. Nigerian soldiers were right there with Orde Wingate when Emperor Haile Selassie was returned to power in Addis Ababa. The Nigerian and Gold Coast troops who fought in East Africa later joined the 82nd (West Africa) Division in Burma.

In Burma, from 1943-45, as part of the 81st and 82nd West African Divisions, the Nigeria regiment of the West African Frontier Force also fought in North Arakan, Kaladan, Mayu Valley, Myohaung, Arakan Beaches, Kangaw, Dalet and Tamandu and was a component of Chindit operations in 1944. The high point of the Nigerian regiment in Burma was the fall of Myohaung on January 24-25, 1945. Before independence, January 25 used to be celebrated annually in Nigeria as an official military day.

...

The 82nd West African Division, at various times under under Maj. Gen. H.G. Stockwell (D.S.O.), Maj. Gen. G. Mc. I.I. Scott-Bruce (O.B.E. M.C.) and Maj. Gen. C.R.A. Swynnerton (D.S.O.) was dispatched to India in July 1944, to join the XV corps as part of the " Fourteenth Army" under Slim.

On December 15, 1944 the 82nd Div captured Buthidaung and created a bridgehead on the east bank of the Kalapanzin. This allowed allied troops to control the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road and enabled the transportation of 650 river craft by road through tunnels to Buthidaung. These were needed for Indian operations east of the Mayu range.

From the Kalapanzin Valley, it moved down the Mayu Peninsula and then linked up with the 81st West African Division in the assault on Myohaung and subsequent operations. This division had six (6) Nigerian battalions, three (3) of whom were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Nigerian Rifles of the 1st West African Brigade led by Brigadier C.R.A.Swynnerton (D.S.O.) and Brigadier. F.W. Clowes. The other three (3) were the 8th, 9th and 10th battalions Nigerian Rifles of the 4th West African Brigade led (at various times) by Brigadier. H. Gibbons (M.C.), Brig. A.H.G. Ricketts (O.B.E. D.S.O.) and Brigadier H.G. Stockwell (C.B.E. D.S.O.). The 2nd West African Brigade was comprised of Ghanaian troops.

After the fall of Myohaung, Kangaw, Ramree and Cheduba, the Japanese 54th Division were divided in two, around An and Taungup. In order to dissuade the Japanese 55th division from coming to the rescue, pressure had to be placed on the Taungup road. The 82nd Div was asked to cross the tough Mountain Hills of Dalet Chaung (dependent on air supply) in order to approach the An Pass from the North west direction while the 26th Division captured Ru-ywa. The 1st and 4th (Nigerian) Brigades suffered heavy casualties in breaking the routes open to Kaw and Kyweguseik in late February. The 4th Brigade even lost two of its commanding officers. However, by March, in coordination with Indian units, Dalet Chaung and the strategic supply base of Tamandu, were taken.

With Tamandu taken, the 82nd Division focused on An. The Gold Coast 2nd Brigade based at Letmauk became the focus of intense Japanese attacks, sustaining heavy casualties in the process. They only barely withdrew under covering fire from the 1st (Nigerian) Brigade. By sending long distance fighting patrols to harass the Japanese flanks the Nigerian unit was able to force a Japanese retreat and retake An on May 13, 1945.

It was mainly Nigerians of the 82nd Division that achieved the subsequent clearance of Japanese forces from the coastal belt of the south Arakan. In April, the Division, with the East African 22nd Brigade now under command, advanced south from Tamandu. By the end of May, Kindaungyyi, Taungup and Sandoway had been captured. The end was in sight.

Both the 81st and 82nd Divisions achieved their duties with excellence. Their casualties were the heaviest in the XV Corps under Christison. According to the Commonwealth Graves Commission, total numbers of lost, killed and wounded were 438 for the 81st (W.A.) Div and 2,085 for the 82nd (W.A.) Div. In addition to those buried in jungle tracts, many Nigerian graves remain in cemeteries of Burma like the Dalet Chaung near Tamandu and the Taukyan War Cemetery. Others are remembered at the War Memorial in Rangoon.

On 2nd February, 74 Brigade came across the Minchaung and 82 (West African) Division; West African 2 Brigade closed up. 51 Brigade sent out patrols to Perth. The gap left between these two had left a gap for the Matzu detachment to make their desperate attack on Hill 170. The result of the battle was that the Commandos lost 45 killed and 90 wounded. 50% of these had been in No. 1 Commando, who lost 22 killed and 44 wounded. The battle broke the spirit of Miyazaki's Division. In the next ten days units of 154 Regimental Group lost 1000 men and quantities of equipment as they tried to escape from 74 Brigade and 51 Brigade and 82 (West African) Division. It was, of course, George Knowland's section on Hill 170 on which this whole battle hinged. He had received the first blows and the failure to take Hill 170 upset the whole of the Japanese attack. The whole battle cost the Japanese approximately 2500 casualties.

1 Feb: KISTNA and FLAMINGO provided harassing fire on Kweguseik.

2 Feb: NARBADA joined Force. L.C.A.'s carried out landings with patrols of 74th Brigade of the 25th Indian Division, Min Chaung. Survey vessel NGUVA came under fire in the vicinity of Kantaunggyi – no damage

4 Feb: Forces redisposed to maximum strength, Tok Chaung.

6 Feb: NARBADA and KISTNA carried out harassing fire, Tamandu. L.C.A.'s supported reconnaissance in North Chaung, Kangaw.

7 Feb: JUMNA joined NARBADA and KISTNA. Tamandu bombarded by all three. M.L.'s carrying out offensive patrols Dalet Chaung. North Chaung, Kangaw area, still controlled by enemy. Naval Forces subjected to gunfire. No casualties.

8 Feb: Sloops continued bombardment Tamandu. M.L.'s patrol Dalet Chaung.

9 Feb: Bombardment Tamandu completed. Highly successful. Small craft blocking exits to South from Kangaw. Enemy activity in Kangaw area and Min Chaung (north of Kangaw).

10 Feb: L.C.A.'s landed Commandos Tatya area, south of Kantaunggyi. Enemy guns knocked out by Naval forces.

14 Feb: Sloops continued harassing fire on Tamandu.

16 Feb: Assault landing North of Ru Ywa with 53rd Brigade of the 25th Indian Division from Myebon, a.m. 16th supported by three sloops and small craft. M.L.'s made diversion to the northward in the Tamandu area and surprise was achieved. Guns in beachhead area silenced by NARBADA.

18 Feb: 2nd Brigade of the 82nd West African Division lifted from Kangaw to Ru Ywa. First flight of 1200 men plus equipment and mules.

19 Feb: Sloops continued support in beachhead areas. Further lift of troops from Kangaw: 2nd Brigade West Africans and 74th Brigade/25th Indian Division all from Kangaw. Complete control of Kangaw area gained.

20 Feb: Northern beachhead Ru Ywa covered by enemy 4 inch mortar. Some casualties in craft. Beachhead closed for period and build up hampered in consequence. Heavy shelling on M.L.'s at entrance to assault Chaung. Heavy mortar fire in area.

22 Feb: NARBADA received direct hit after. Minor damage only. She remained in area.

23 Feb: JUMNA left for Colombo. CAUVERY arrived Akyab from Colombo.

24 Feb: Enemy shelling of assault beaches continued. Landing of reinforcements continued by night. Sloops supported military advance to North and East from Ru Ywa.

...
We may now turn to the story of the sloops, and to state briefly the position on land. The assault on the Kangaw area by the 3rd Commando Brigade on 21 January under the support of the Narbada and Jumna has already been described. The 51st Brigade was subsequently landed. The 74th Brigade advancing from Myebon continued its attack on the western side of the Kyaukgnmaw river, and later carried out raids on the eastern bank to the north of Kangaw. The 82nd West African Division was pressing southward towards Kangaw from the direction of Hpontha. The Japanese fought hard in the Kangaw area carrying out repeated counterattacks. They threw into the battle the largest concentration of artillery yet met by our troops in Burma, but by 3 February it was evident that they were commencing a general withdrawal southwards, and it was decided to use the sloops to bombard targets on their line of retreat.
The object of sloops' next operation, therefore, was the harassment of the Japanese line of communications between Kyweguseik and Tamandu and especially the ferry crossing on the Dalet Chaung....
...
With the mopping-up operations in the Myebon-Kangaw area being practically complete, the next step was to harass the Japanese withdrawal southward towards Dalet (headquarters of the Japanese 54th Division), Tamandu and An.
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Ruywa, 20 miles south of Dalet, was once again the area of operations for the landing craft of the Royal Indian Navy. This young branch of the service landed the 25th Indian Division troops dead on schedule at Ruywa and became also their main supply link. The Naval Assault Force assembled in full daylight inside a chaung, a considerable distance from the open sea. Led by Arakan Coastal Force motor launches, the minor landing craft-mainly Royal Indian Navy--proceeded further upstream and were diverted unescorted into a smaller chaung continuing for another hour up a narrow winding channel before unleashing the first wave of troops into thick jungle. By the time the third wave had landed, the jungle had been cleared. This technique of amphibious landings up small creeks amidst thick jungle was far removed from the traditional conception of sand beaches and heavy naval units lying just off-shore. Nor was this the only hazard our men were overcoming in those landings. At Ruywa the shallowness of the creeks was an additional problem and rendered the beach usable only at certain stages of the tide. Yet, the Naval Assault Force was able to fulfil all its assignments, and by the end of the first day, the 25th Indian Division troops had reached their initial objectives exactly as planned. The rapid succession of landings on the Arakan coast surprised the Japanese forces and at Ruywa once more tactical surprise was achieved.

On 16 February the assault operation was carried out. The initial object was to land the 53rd Brigade to secure a beachhead through which the 2nd West African Brigade and the 74th Indian Infantry Brigade would be able to advance on An and Tamandu, respectively. The bombarding force was to support the landing of the 53rd Indian Infantry Brigade, and later, after the initial assault, to support the operations of the two other Brigades, and also the advance by the 5th Nigerian Rifles from Kyweguseik Ngamankai Ywat Hit.
...
On another occasion the 3rd Gold Coast Regiment called for fire on a defended position on a hill 1,262 feet high at a range of 1,500 yards. For this bombardment our forward troops were stationed a thousand yards short of the position, a thousand yards beyond it and a thousand yards to the right of it in dense bamboo jungle. In spite of their close proximity to the target, the shoot was successfully carried out, and the Japanese were dislodged from their position, enabling the Africans to advance without opposition at this key point.
...

The principal speaker for this evening was Major Alistair Martin. Maj. Martin joined the army in 1941 as a gunner and transferred to infantry in 1943. He was seconded to the Royal West African Frontier Force in June of 1944. When they were sent to India in August of 1944 for training, he was serving with 2nd Battalion, the Nigeria Regiment. this Battalion was part of 1st (West African) Brigade in Burma from November 1944 until 1946. In 1947, Maj. Martin emigrated to South Africa and joined the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. He has been a member of the Committee of the JSE since 1960 and was President from 1968 to 1970. The subject of his talk had its roots in his personal experiences in Burma during "The Campaign in the Arakan".

The Arakan is the coastal strip of Burma on the Bay of Bengal stretching from Chittagong to the south. This area is very difficult for campaigning as there were no roads crossing this area and 2 to 3 hundred inches of rainfall during the five months of the monsoon. Such communications as did exist prior to the war consisted of tracks and a few railway lines (of various gauges) whose railheads were far from the theatre of action. An attempt was made to improve the situation by building brick factories every 10 miles along a proposed route and making the roadway from bricks. It was this very lack of communication facilities that made the West African troops so valuable and led to their deployment in the Arakan campaign.

It is often forgotten, as are so many aspects of the 14th Army's war, that the Burmese front not only controlled the supply lines to China (of great concern to the USA) but also constituted the largest land front against the Japanese. The area saw warfare wash across it many times from the retreat in 1942 until the victorious advance in 1945. There were several offensives in the Arakan, the first of which occurred in December of 42. Following the fall of Rangoon and the withdrawal to Imphal there was a lull during the May to September monsoon season following which the re-equipped Allies launched the attack with much pomp and circumstance. It bogged down in Feb. 43 at the heavily fortified and well dug in Japanese position at Donbaik where 2.5 months were spent attacking on a very narrow front. Despite the increase of force from 3 to 9 battalions and the use of armour this assault failed and the 43 monsoon saw the Allied forces back in Chittagong. In Jan. 44 XV Corps attacked again in the Arakan and there was a Japanese counter attack in Feb. This counter attack spread to the Central and Northern Burmese fronts where the Japanese failed to take Kohima and Imphal despite massive losses and the pressing of attacks throughout the monsoon. After the Japanese had expended their strength along the Chidwin River line the third and final Arakan offensive began in Jan. 45. This advance included Maj. Martin and 1st (West African) Brigade forming part of 82nd West African Division in XV Corps.

It is freely admitted that the African troops were not of the highest quality but they had special capabilities that made them invaluable in this theatre. The country was extremely thick and permitted movement only along the river beds or on tracks along the crests of very steep ridges. Under these conditions conventional transport would have been impractical if not impossible. Even mule trains would have needed a 5 foot path width which was not always available. The West African troops, however, used no transport at all but carried all equipment and supplies as head-loads with the units being augmented with 1500 bearers. Re-supply was executed as airdrops from 2-300 feet altitude after which the air canisters were carried by headpack until they could be broken down to individual loads. The wounded were also carried by head loaded stretchers until they could be evacuated by small aircraft from strips hacked out of the jungle. It is to be noted that these factors resulted in arm aputees being classified as "walking wounded". Since the evacuating aircraft could only take one stretcher at a time as few as 300 stretcher cases would virtually immobilise the group. On one occasion assault boats were head carried by 6 men each for 7 miles to make a river crossing.

In addition to battle casualties, the medical officers had to deal with the question of disease. Maj. Martin stated that the ratio of sick to wounded was 182 to 1. The biggest problem in this area was malaria. Mepacrin tablets were taken daily but they were not a preventive for the disease but rather a suppressant for its effects. The troops were continually reminded of the need for field hygiene but dysentery and other such diseases were still present. As well as the usual jungle diseases, the troops were found to be suffering from venereal disease, yaws, bilharzia and in 6 cases leprosy. These were mostly endemic to West Africa and had been brought out in the men by the stress of the conditions of combat and movement.

Engineering was primarily carpentry as the most usual requirement was for rough rafts on which to cross rivers. Artillery support consisted of 26 3-inch mortars with 15 rounds per gun. The mortars and their ammunition were carried by headpack as was everything else. With the limit of what could be carried fire discipline became critical because it would be possible to fire off the nearly the entire complement of ammunition in a few hours. This did happen from time to time when the "jitterbug" struck and men began blazing away at nothing. Officers quickly learned the Hausa for 'stop firing' but during the jitterbugs it was far safer to stay in one's own entrencment and wait for it to die down.

In summary, Maj. Martin explained that the West Africans may not have been first class soldiers but they were cheerful and hard working. Each man was a volunteer and was glad to be a soldier. Their morale was much better than that of the British troops in the same area. This may have been because they did not miss the NAFI, leave or rest camps which the average Tommy considered essential.

Photocopy of his ms account (14pp, written 'soon after the events') recording his service as a platoon commander with the 1st Battalion Gold Coast Regiment RWAFF (2nd West African Brigade, 82nd West African Division in Burma in the Arakan and the Kaladan Valley (October 1944 - May 1945), including the journey from Chas (Bihar, India) to the Arakan (October 1944 - December 1944); the capture of Buthidaung and the advance down the Kaladan Valley (January 1945 - February 1945) in conjunction with the landings at Akyab, Kangaw and on Ramree Island; embarking at Kangaw to land at the beach-head at Ru-Ywa advancing against fierce Japanese resistance, reliant on air drops for supply (February 1945 - March 1945); being evacuated sick to a hospital ship at Akyab (March 1945); rejoining his unit assaulting Taungup (April 1945 - May 1945); flying with a party of men to Rangoon to take part in a Victory Parade and attend an investiture by Lord Mountbatten (June 1945); and commenting on the conditions and rations; patrolling; Japanese ambushes and attacks; jungle warfare; inaccurate maps; the destruction of battle, notably the bodies and equipment left behind by the retreating Japanese; the casualties from battle and disease; his African troops and his fellow officers; Japanese tactics and heavy casualties.

Also included are ts extracts from the 'History of 3rd Battalion The Gold Coast Regiment RWAFF in the Arakan Campaign, October 1944 - May 1945' (29pp) giving an Order of Battle with ms annotations and covering the move from India to the Arakan (October 1944 - December 1944); operations at Buthidaung (December 1944 - January 1945); the move to the Kaladan - Lemro Valleys (January 1945 - February 1945); the advance to Kangaw (February 1945); the action at the Gyethinka Chaung (February 1945); the advance from the Ru-Ywa Bridgehead (February 1945 - March 1945); occupying Shawbin Taung (March 1945); and the advance to Tamandu-Taunup (April - May 1945).

Synopsis:

Troops from 82nd West African Division arrive at Ru-Ywa, Burma, by boat and are met by Major-General Stockwell and Lieutenant-Colonel Sharpe.

Troops, mules and material arrive by landing craft at Ru-Ywa. Soldiers of 82nd West African Division wait in boats on the river and then disembark. Fighter aircraft patrol the landing areas and stores are unloaded. An airdrop by a C47 Skytrain (Dakota) from a low altitude falls near to the soldiers. Aerial reconnaissance of Japanese positions.

Notes:

The purpose of these landings was to enable 2nd West African Brigade (82nd West African Division) and 74th Indian Brigade (25th Indian Division, XV Indian Corps) to move north and attack Japanese forces being held near Tamandu.

For other films of the 82nd West African Division's landings at Ru-Ywa, see related items.

Synopsis:

After being cut off by Japanese forces from the rest of the British force northeast of Letmauk, Burma, for two weeks the 2nd Brigade 82nd West African Division took heavy casualties; the casualties are evacuated from an improvised airstrip to Akyab and Kyaukpyu.

A casualty is brought by African soldiers to a Stinson L-5 Sentinel. The stretcher is loaded onto the plane. The plane takes off right to left and kicks up a lot of dust. An African soldier with a dressing on a face wound sits in a plane. Another L-5 is loaded with a stretcher case; the stretcher is strapped into the plane. The L-5 takes off. A stretcher with casualty is loaded onto a jeep. Four jeeps move off carrying wounded. Approximately twelve soldiers on stretchers are laid out in rows on the ground. One waves a white cloth above his head to keep flies away. The soldiers have bandages on various parts of their bodies. A white doctor looks at medical cards. A white soldier is loaded onto an L-5. The pilot in the cockpit. A sign for the "75 MDS" (Main Dressing Station). An African soldier sits on the ground juggling two oranges with one hand; another soldier stands and watches as he smokes.

Notes:

According to the dopesheet, after 2nd West African Brigade was able to link up with 1st West African Brigade, some 240 wounded were brought to this Dressing Station. The most severe cases were flown out, presumably to field hospitals, on Akyab and Ramree, with less serious cases going to jeep before being transferred to hospital ship.

See also JFU 113.

Synopsis:

In the jungle around the town of Tamandu, Burma, a field hospital has been set up to look after casualties from 82nd West African Division wounded in action against the Japanese.
...

Notes

The background narrative on the dopesheet states 'The Field Hospitals that are built in the Jungle consist mostly of Bamboo stakes covered with leaves etc. Under such conditions with none of the facilities used in Modern Hospitals the RAMC Officers have performed some of the most difficult operations. Battle Casualties in the Jungle have to be carried long distances on stretchers and the West African bearers prefer to carry the stretchers on their heads'.
...

Context:

This footage of West African troops receiving treatment at a field hospital near Tamandu is best viewed as a continuation of footage featured in JFU 114 ('Evacuation of West African Casualties from Letmauk by Air and Road'), which was filmed on the same day approximately ten miles away near Letmauk. In the dope sheet for JFU 114, the cameraman Sergeant T.V. Brown outlined the situation that led to the arrival of these casualties at Tamandu.

Brown reported that in the jungle to the north east of Letmauk, two Brigades of the 82 West African Division had become 'completely cut off from the rest of the division for two weeks'. After suffering 'considerable casualties' during this period, the two brigades linked up again with the Division, which was holding the village of Letmauk, on 25 March. On the following day, when these films were shot, the most serious of the 240 wounded Africans were flown to Akyab and Kyaukpyu. 'The remainder were', the dope sheet explained, 'evacuated by jeep ambulances to Tamandu where they were transferred to a hospital ship'. These two films, while filmed in different locations by separate cameramen, thus illustrate the full journey and scale of this military operation ('Dope Sheet for JFU 114').

Mark Harrison, in his work on British military medicine during the War, emphasised the mobility of the medical units within Burma. In order to avoid bringing in general hospitals and moving large medical equipment across the region, it was decided to 'evacuate all serious cases by air, and to carry CCSs [Casualty Clearing Stations] and MFTUs [Malaria Forward Treatment Units] as the only hospital units with the army'. 'Flexibility was the order of the day', Harrison suggested, 'with medical centres being continually reconstituted' (Harrison, 2004, 223). A reliance on air support was integral to this system, and was widely noted in contemporary reports. For example, The Times wrote in April 1945 that 'air transport in Burma has been the means of saving the lives of many soldiers who would probably have died before they could reach hospital by surface transport' (The Times, 27 April 27 1945, 5). What may have previously been a week-long journey, the paper suggested, could now be achieved in a couple of hours. Harrison further argued that the Allies' superior medical arrangements and transport ensured that 'the vast majority of Allied casualties recovered and were returned to duty quickly thanks to forward treatment, but the Japanese, whose medical services had fallen into disarray, died from “lack of medical care, exposure and exhaustion”' (Harrison, 2004, 221).
...

...

On 10th January 4 Brigade of 82 (W.A.) Division arrived and
came under command for the operation to capture Myohaung.

It was expected that this position would be strongly defended,
and the operation was carefully timed in co-operation with 25
Division (pages 401-403) so that the combined attack would entrap as
many Japanese as possible. On the 23rd it was discovered that the
enemy was evacuating, and 1 and 2 Brigades of 82 (W.A.) Division
were rushed to the spot. Features encircling the town were oc-
cupied, and it was entered on the 25th to find that the garrison had
disintegrated.

On 20th January one gun of 33 Battery (now commanded by
Major McGee, Major Williams having been posted to the Staff
College) was ordered to come into action in a battalion-defended
area well forward. Owing to a misunderstanding with the infantry
guide, the gun, which was in draught, was moved on past the R.V.t
through the area and deep into the Japanese lines. The sub-section
was ambushed and, the mules having been shot in the first burst of
fire, the enemy was able to capture the gun. It was found a few days
later undamaged.

The 30th Indian Mountain Regiment then came under command
of 82 (W.A.) Division. 81 Division, having completed its task,
returned to Chiringa pending its final withdrawal.

* Havildar Umrao Singh was also the only other rank of the Royal Regiment
awarded the V.C. in the 1939-45 war.
t Appendix, p. 453.

398



Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. R. Hill was awarded the O.B.E. and
Major J. M. G. Williams the M.B.F. after these operations.

Captain Pillar, quartermaster of the Regiment, was awarded the
M.B.E. for his excellent work in organizing the supplies by air-drop.
The 30th Mountain Regiment's casualties since 1st November,
1944, now amounted to:

Killed in action 5 personnel, 13 animals.

Missing 1 personnel.

Wounded 23 personnel.

Evacuated sick 19 personnel.

82 ( West African) Division

This division was detailed to guard the left flank of 25 Indian
Division, whose task was to make a rapid move on Akyab along both
sides of the Mayu range. Buthidaung was captured on "D" day
(14th December), and the division moved swiftly south against little
opposition through a country cut up by rivers and chaungs. The
jeep-drawn 3.7-inch howitzers were left behind and field guns were
run ashore from their rafts before coming into action.

Brigadier R. H. M. Hill was C.R.A. of the division, and on arrival
at Htizwe in mid-January two mountain batteries (19th and 34th)
of 25 Indian Division joined 82 Division for the operations against
Myohaung. There was no very strenuous opposition, but a great
deal of very bad ground to cover; three main river crossings, Kala-
panzin, Kaladan and Lemro, and the Kan Zauk Pass, a very stiff
climb, had to be negotiated. The batteries sent for their mules and
started off in pack, and found it very hard work for man and mule.
Myohaung was captured on 25th January, and the division, now
under Major-General II. C. Stockwcll, after relieving 81 (W.A.)
Division, set off in pursuit of the Japanese, not without fighting on
the way. On 9th February 2 (W.A.) Brigade, with 34th Battery in
support, came under command of 25 Indian Division for the attack
on Kangaw, this division having arrived by water. (For the battle
of Kangaw see pages 402-403.)

The other two brigades of 82 Division, with the batteries of 30th
Mountain Regiment in support, were pushing down from the north,
directed on An, in order to cut the escape routes of the garrison of
Kangaw, while 2 (W.A.) Brigade passed through the newly taken
bridgehead at Ru-Ywa, where 34th Battery suffered considerable
casualties, and moved on An from the south-west. Maintenance was
by air, since the division was going through some of the thickest
and most mountainous country in the whole of the Arakan, or, as
officially expressed, "a country of great topographical difficulties."

399



Every yard of the path had to be cut out of the jungle. The battery
commanders looked on it as "a three weeks' nightmare of wandering
in awful jungle, short of rations and continuously attacked -in
fact it was recorded as the most unpleasant part of the war. J he
I O Rs kept up their spirits under these hardships, and the mules
only suffered from lack of water occasionally. The lighter side of
the picture was, as one officer wrote, the look of surprise on a Jap
officer's face when his one remaining field piece received a direct
hit. He had put it into action in a spot very convenient to No. 2 gun
without any suspicion that a mountain battery was 300 yards away.
This encirclement, meant to entrap the Japanese 54 Division had
to be left incomplete owing to a sudden reduction in the air-drop,
and 82 Division then took up the line An-Tamandu.

Near Tamandu a river had to be crossed by two brigades at the
only ford, ninety-five yards across, which was dominated by an
enemy bunker dug deep on our side of the river in the bank which
fell twenty feet sheer to the river. After infantry attacks had failed,
it was decided that the only effective way of destroying the bunker
was for a gun to engage it at point-blank range from the far side of
the river— obviously a job for a mountain gun. It entailed a very
difficult approach through pathless jungle, up and down hills so
steep that the loads had to be carried separately by the goners, to
a point upstream where the gun and ammunition could be ferried
over. A double detachment was taken and willing helpers earned
the ammunition boxes.

By good fortune a grove of banana trees grew opposite the target
and certain trees in the rear of the river bank were easily cut down
without noise. Noiselessly and with much crawling, a 3 foot 6 inch
parapet was built up in the long grass of the undergrowth, with bags
of grain and ammunition boxes filled with earth to protect the
detachment. Shields were not fixed on account of the noise, and
mortar discharges and desultory firing were carried out to distract
the enemy's attention. The detachment was in some danger from
splinters of our own mortar bombs.

Ten rounds H.E. with delay action fuzes were fired point-blank
as quickly as possible, and when the smoke and dust had c eared
away the target area was unrecognizable and the river bank had
caved in and disappeared into the river. There was no answering
shot or any si«?n of an enemy, so the area fifty yards round the bunker
was destroyed with a mixture of delay action and direct action H.b.
Many splinters came back over the gun, and cotton-wool in the ears
was found essential.

This operation was carried out by the Regimental Commander of

400



the 30th Mountain Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. R. Hill,
with a gun of 32nd Battery.

The enemy, however, continued to guard the ford by tire Irom
the bunker, and it took a further attack and an airstrike to finally
eject the last half-dozen Japanese from their position. For six days
the division had been held up by small-arms fire at the crossing and
it eventually crossed elsewhere after making a detour.

The 33rd Battery took part in the bombardments during this
operation.

Close at Kyaukpyu the regiment bivouacked at Sanyin lor a
fortnieht and found thai it was using the watering-place of a herd oi
wild elephants. They gave a lot of trouble for the first three nights
and the mules were prevented with difficulty from stampeding.
The nights were cold now and rugs made from parachutes were
much appreciated by the animals.

On 26th March the regiment arrived on Ramree island, where
27th Battery was already camped, and remained there until sailing
for Madras, where it arrived on 3rd June.

The 19th and 34th Mountain Batteries were sent to Akyab to

rejoin their division. .

82 (W A ) Division remained in Arakan, clearing up the southern
district and the ports, until June, when as part of 4 Corps it joined
in the operations to round up the Japanese not yet dealt with in
Burma.

25 Indian Division .

On the Mayu front 25 Division was opposed by Japanese 55 Divi-
sion infantry Croup, greatly under strength. The 74 Indian Brigade
started two days before "D" day on the west flank of the range,
keeping as close to the sea as possible with battalions leapfrog
by short bounds. After minor opposition the brigade reached
Donbaik and closed up, then by rapid moves it seized Foul Point
on 29th December, seventeen days in front of the ^-Uble

The 33rd Mountain Regiment [19th (Maymyo) and 34th Batteries]
was under 53 Infantry Brigade, which had beer .trained for an
amphibious assault on the north-west corner of Akyab land to
be followed by the capture of Akyab from the landward side. Ihe
brigade had first to clear Kudaung island, which lies to the north of
Akyab. The Brigade Group was operating on a boat baas down the
Kaiapanzin river, and the mountain battery mules soon . b came a
liability for feeding, and the ferrying over n ™ ero " s q ^ n g* h ^
became tidal nearer the sea took up so much time that the Brigadier
StTe mules back, and the howitzers and detachments continued

401



the journey on very old rafts with outboard motors, coming into
action on the bank when required. While crossing at Kwazu on
29th December, a raft or boat containing a sub-section of 34th
Battery overturned and thirteen I.O.Rs. were drowned.

The brigade travelled downstream at speed, collecting prisoners
here and there, and landed on Kudaung island on the 3 1st. Naval
launches had now rounded Foul Point and joined the flotilla, and
before dawn on 3rd January 4 R. Garhwal Rifles made a scramble
landing on Akyab island, closely followed by a gun of 34 Battery.
The town and harbour fell without opposition the following day,
six weeks ahead of schedule.

The task of capturing Akyab had been allotted to 26 Division,
but that division now by-passed it and carried on with the capture of
Ramree.

The next task for 25 Division was an assault on Myebon. There
was some sharp fighting when the Commando Brigade landed on
Myebon Peninsula on 12th January after a heavy naval bombardment
and air attack ; 74 Brigade and Sherman tanks followed the next day.
Stragglers had to be eliminated and naval craft cleared the channels,
permitting divisional H.Q. to open at Myebon on the 18th.

Kangaw was on the supply line and line of retreat of the Japanese,
now making a co-ordinated withdrawal, and, their water L. of C.
being closed to them, their only escape route was the Myohaung-
Tamandu road. The corps commander determined to cut this
road at Kangaw where it leaves the plains and turns east into the
hills.

The land approach was in the open and unfavourable, but after
a naval reconnaissance of a twenty-mile route through some
chaungs and mangrove swamps, 3 Commando Brigade landed a
couple of miles from the position on 22nd January. The enemy was
taken completely by surprise, but reacted quickly with intensive
shelling and counter-attacks. However, the Commando Brigade
gave no ground, and within forty-eight hours was reinforced by
51 Indian Brigade (an all-Indian formation) which landed under
heavy fire and pushed through the beach-head. Enemy defences
were found to be very strongly held and a considerable number of
casualties were sustained. A very strong counter-attack was repulsed
on 28th/29th, and early on 31st the Japanese launched the most
desperate attack of the Arakan campaign, recoiling after receiving
severe punishment.

Enemy shelling in this attack was the heaviest met with, and as it
had only been possible to get small detachments of 43 Survey

402



Battery forward, counter-battery action was on a small scale.
The flash-spotting post was knocked out by an unlucky round,
though useful work was put in by a short base one manned later.
The C.R.A. made use of a V.H.F. set and controlled C.B. work
satisfactorily by this means.

The following day Kangaw was captured and the road cut. The
enemy lost 2,000 killed and 16 guns. The trap was now closing from
the north, whence 82 (W.A.) Division was arriving; and after
clearing the road from Minbya, in the face of considerable opposi-
tion, this division passed under command of 25 Indian Division on
9th February.

25 Division then captured Tamandu while 82 Division was making
its difficult march to An ( pages 399-401 ) ; but the two batteries* of 33rd
Mountain Regiment did not rejoin their division until it concen-
trated at Akyab. From Akyab 25 Division returned to India; the
34th Battery reached Calcutta on 11th April and 19th (Maymyo)
Battery disembarked at Madras in May, where the 33rd Mountain
Regiment was made up to strength by the addition of the 35th
Indian Mountain Battery.

26 Indian Division

Major-General C. F. N. Lomax had been training the division
for some months for a sea-borne assault to capture Akyab. During
December information came in to the effect that the enemy was
evacuating the island, and on 1st January Captain C. J. B. Jarrett,
M C R A landed an aircraft of his Air O.P. Squadron on a strip
prepared by the local inhabitants. The elaborate combined forces
programme was, therefore, not required, and the divisional plan,
which included 3 Commando Brigade and 27th Mountain Battery,
was switched to Ramrce island. This island-sixty miles long-
contained a sheltered anchorage and plenty of room for airfields,
and was a vital link in the enemy's L. of C. The operation was
timed for 21st January, twenty-four hours before the landing at Kan-
gaw and three days before Myohaung in the Kaladan valley was cap-
tured A very heavy naval and air bombardment assisted to put
4 and 71 Indian Infantry Brigades ashore at Kyaukpyu^ and by
the 24th, thirty miles of the west coast were ours. The 27th Battery
embarked at Chittagong on 23rd January and on 26th landed on
the beach-head at Kyaukpyu, joining inwith 36 Indian^ Brigade on

* 34th Battery lost Lieutenant D. S. Nutlall, killed by a bomb, on 1 5th March.

I HMS Oueen Elizabeth and an aircraft carrier took part. The battleship
had not fired her 15-inch guns in anger since the bombardment of the Da-
danelles forts in 1915.

403



30th January in an assault landing on Sagu Kyun island, south of
Ramree, which was supported by the fire of two destroyers and was
successful. The battery went on in support of 8/13 F.F.R. for ten
days in February, and on 15th February landed on the Kaladan
Peninsula and was in action until the end of the month.

26 Division joined 82 (W.A.) Division in the operations in the
An district, and on 14th April began to concentrate at Kyaukpyu
for the return to India.

The Japanese had been driven out of Arakan and 54 and 55
Japanese Divisions practically destroyed.

...

Rains ended, the division left its Monsoon positions and started spread­ing out. In December they captured Buthidaung, with the help of the 82nd (West African) Division. Men of the Baluch Regiment, 2nd Gurkha Rifles and the Ox and Bucks Light Infantry took part in this operation.

With Buthidaung in our hands the division began their advance down the Mayu Peninsula, and 11 days later they had reached Foul Point at its tip.

Troops of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, the 18th Garhwal Rifles and the York and Lancaster Regiment ad­vanced down the west bank of the Mayu river with the 82nd on the east bank.

By the time the West Africans had captured Tinwa, north of Kyauktaw on the Kaladan river, it was obvious that the Japs were pulling out faster than expected. The rate of our advance surprised the enemy and it was decided at this stage to press home the attack as expeditiously as possible.

Akyab was the next objective — a fair reward for long months of patient waiting. To save time, 25 Div was em­barked across the Mayu estuary, early in the New Year. On 3 January 1945 the division landed unopposed on Akyab and began the long advance southwards.

Although Akyab was an easy vic­tory; fierce fighting lay ahead of the division when five days later it took part in the amphibious landings on the Myebon Peninsula. Position after position fell to Commandos and Indian and British troops as they swept on, strongly supported from sea and air.

Pressing inland, the division was soon launching its attack on Kangaw in the bloodiest battle fought since the operations began. The 10th Baluch, the 19th Hyderabad and the 2nd Punjab were employed in this battle and for four weeks, from 22 January to 18 February, fighting continued.

Kangaw, being on the direct supply line and line of retreat of the Jap forces operating further north, against the 81st (West African) Division. The Japs knew that it must be held at all costs if their forces were not to be cut off and surrounded.

In the four weeks they put in re­peated attacks to try to throw 25 Division back, and on two successive nights poured 600 and 800 shells into our positions.

Fighting their way foot by foot up the hill slopes north-east of Kangaw, Indian troops encountered a “Siegfried Line” of bunkers and trenches defended by concentrations of artillery and machine guns. Recovering from their initial surprise, the Japs fought back with all they had got — and pro­bably more than they could spare.

Most determined counter-attack of all occurred when the Japs attacked our salient in an attempt to sever our supply line. The charge melted away only 50 yards from its starting point under a withering concentration of fire, leaving the field strewn with bodies.

Tanks of the 19th Lancers, the first Indian tanks to take part in a sea landing, did great work in the Kan­gaw area, where the division cut the Jap main escape route from the Ara­kan.

On 16 February a formation of 25 Div landed across the bay at Ru-Ywa. The landing was another shattering surprise to the Japs, and men of the 5th Mahratta swiftly captured the village. Within a few hours more in­fantry arrived and the bridgehead was consolidated.

Even after men of the York and Lancs had got astride the enemy's escape route to Taungup, and the Mahrattas had occupied the dominat­ing features around the bridgehead for more than 24 hours, the enemy was still sending out patrols in a be­wildered attempt to find out what 15th corps intended.

Meanwhile ships of the Royal In­dian Navy, from a fantastic anchorage in the middle of acres of mangrove, had been battering Jap strong points with devastating fire. Many of the twisting inland water­ways were uncharted. Ships were moored fore and aft with ropes lashed to mangrove trees to steady their fire. Without doubt this was the most fan­tastic battle front that had till then developed in the Burma theatre of war.

Next came Taniandu, a pre-war river ferry station which made a valu­able supply base for the army.

The Japs here threw in a new trick, hurling mines attached to grenades into the Gurkha's positions. While one Gurkha platoon was working des­perately to dig in on the hillside in the failing light, Jap jitter parties came up in trucks. The Gurkhas were caught before their trenches were ready. Until one a.m. this “war of nerves” went on, and then the Japs came in with a full-scale attack. The Gurkhas held them off till their am­munition gave out.

At three p.m. next day the Japs came back for more. Gurkha casual­ties were heavy — but the Japs paid dearly. The toil and tumult of this fighting was followed by a few “light” days -then 25 Div, after a solid year of action, was given a rest.

LAPAGE, Peter Reginald. War Substantive Captain. (97460)

2nd Lt 24/08/1939
War Substantive Lt 01/03/1941
Temporary Capt 16/07/1941
Capt 02/10/1945 (Honorary Major)
Military Cross 02/08/1945 Burma while serving in 102nd Light Regiment West

Recommended for Immediate award of the Military Cross

102nd Light Regiment West Africa Artillery, 2nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade, 82nd (West Africa) Division, 15th Indian Corps. Date of recommendation 14th February 1945.

ARAKAN. At 0730 hrs, on Feb 6th 1945, Capt Lapage (acting as Artillery F.O.O., with one SNCO) was left with one section of 'B' Coy 1 GCR at hill feature 100 (511677) to act as a firm base for a patrol which had gone forward to recce the village of KANI. Soon after a party of heavily armed enemy, approx 30 - 40 strong, whose arms included one Anti Tank rifle, one MG, three LMGs, rifles and Mills grenades, attacked the firm base. The attack was put in with great determination and supported with accurate fire from all the weapons mentioned.

The firm base was disposed in an "all round" position, and the main weight of the attack fell on Captain Lapage's sector where he, his Senior NCO and four Africans, including one Bren gunner, were posted. The attack continued for from 45 minuets to one hour, the repeatedly charging the position, to be driven off by the two Sten guns of Captain Lapage and his SNCO and the Bren gun of the African section.

In between attacks, extremely heavy and accurate fire was directed on the position. After half and hour of these attacks, when four of the section were wounded, and ammunition was running low, the SNCO (an experienced infantry man) advised Captain Lapage to withdraw. This he refused to do and, by his utter disregard for personal danger, and his exemplary leadership, he so inspired the personnel of his very small post that they not only inflicted heavy casualties, estimated at ten to fifteen dead or seriously wounded, on an immediate superior force of the enemy, but also drove off in disorder Westwards, where they fell into the hands of 'B' Company 1 GCR and were finally destroyed. It is estimated that only two of this enemy force escaped alive and unwounded.

Had not Captain Lapage acted as he did his party would, undoubtedly, have been destroyed and also the enemy, he put to flight, would have been enabled to take up a position to harass and delay the main column which was advancing on KANI.

Signed B. H. Hazelton OC 1st Bn, The Gold Coast Regt., R.W.A.F.F.
14 Feb 45

Bhanubhakta Gurung, VC

Last Updated: 8:38pm GMT 03/03/2008

Havildar Bhanubhakta Gurung, who has died aged 86, was awarded a VC
when serving as a rifleman in the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Gurkha
Rifles in Burma on March 5 1945.

At that time the Fourteenth Army was making a drive toward Mandalay in
central Burma, and the task of the 25th Division (of which the 2nd
Gurkhas were part) was to engage in diversionary action along the
coastal sector of Arakan.

The 3rd Battalion landed at Ru-Ywa and advanced to the high ground
east of Tamandu. Capturing the area would assist British progress to
the Irawaddy through the An pass, but the enemy here was the
formidable Japanese 54 Division and a machine-gun battalion.

The dominant feature was .582, nicknamed Snowdon, to the east of which
was another high hill known as Snowdon East. No enemy was encountered
on either hill and by the evening of March 4 "A" Company was in
position at both points.

However, during the night the Japanese attacked Snowdon East in
overwhelming strength, killing half the Gurkhas on it; the remainder,
completely out of ammunition, managed to cut their way through to
their comrades on Snowdon.

The following day "B" Company, with which Bhanubhakta was serving, was
ordered to retake Snowdon East "regardless of cost".

Bhanubhakta's citation (in which his name was spelled Bhanbhagta)
recorded that: "On approaching the objective, one of the sections of
the company was forced to the ground by a very heavy light-machine-
gun, grenade and mortar fire, and owing to the severity of this fire
was unable to move in any direction.

"While thus pinned down, the section also came under accurate fire
from a sniper in a tree some 75 yards to the south. As this sniper was
inflicting casualties on the section, Rifleman Bhanbhagta Gurung stood
up and, while fully exposed to heavy fire, calmly killed the enemy
sniper with his rifle, thus saving his section from suffering further
casualties."

Bhanubhakta then began to run for the top of the hill, yelling for his
comrades to follow him. Though the casualties were heavy, the section
ploughed forward until within 20 yards of their objective, when the
Gurkhas were again halted by exceptionally heavy fire.

Without waiting for any orders, Bhanubhakta dashed forward alone and
attacked the first enemy foxhole. Throwing two grenades, which killed
the two occupants of the trench, he immediately rushed on to the next
enemy foxhole and killed the two Japanese in it with his bayonet.

All this time he was under continuous light-machine-gun fire from a
bunker on the north tip of the objective, and two further fox-holes
were still bringing fire to bear upon the section. Bhanubhakta dashed
forward and cleared these trenches with bayonet and grenades.

He then turned his attention to the machine-gun bunker, and realising,
as the citation put it, that it "would hold up not only his own
platoon which was not behind him, but also another platoon which was
advancing from the west", he pushed forward a fifth time to knock out
the position.

"He ran forward and leapt on to the roof of the bunker from where, his
hand grenades being finished, he flung two No 72 smoke grenades into
the bunker's slit." Two Japanese rushed out of the bunker, partially
blinded by the smoke and with their clothes aflame with phosphorous;
Bhanubhakta promptly killed them both with his kukri.

One Japanese soldier remained inside, holding up 4 Platoon's advance
with the machine gun. Bhanubhakta crawled in and, prevented by the
cramped space from using his bayonet or kukri, beat the gunner's
brains out with a rock.

Most of the objectives had now been cleared by the men behind, but the
enemy which had been driven off were collecting for a counter-attack
beneath the north end of the objective.

Bhanubhakta ordered the nearest Bren gunner and two riflemen to take
up positions in the captured bunker with him, from where they repelled
the enemy counter-attack.

Bhanubhakta, the citation concluded, "showed outstanding bravery and a
complete disregard for his own safety. His courageous clearing of five
enemy positions single-handed was in itself decisive in capturing the
objective and his inspiring example to the rest of the Company
contributed to the speedy consolidation of the success."

As a result of this engagement, his regiment gained the Battle Honour
"Tamandu."